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'Il1e 19110s :l.n Latin /l~rica 
Carlos F. n{az Alejandro*
Yale University 
"'Ine world of the thirties, which was Keynesian for onerea50:1-because the worv.i~s cf the price-mechanism \':as so larr-;elysuspended by D::1)ressicn-·,,;a3 succeeded by the world of the fortieswhich was r.e:/n02.im fo-:- quite another reason--because the price-11Echa'1is.11 was super:;ejed by cor1trols. 11 John Hicks (p.992, 1979) 
I • Dfl'RODU~ITOH 
Tne 191:0:::., broadly defined as the years between the Gem.an attack 
on Pola'1d and the windi.ric dovm of the Korean conflict, wii-nessed the 
golden age of irr;:iort-eubstitutjng industrialization in La.tin P.merica. 
Particularly during 1945--52 the economic perfon:iance of Latin Anerica 
shone relative not cnly to those of Africa and Asia, but also those 
of hurope and Japa:1. 'Ihe a.cceleration in industrlalization and urba'1-
izatio:1 which started in the early 1930s continued through the 191J0s end 
into the early 1950s. Im increasingly confident public sector also 
continued du.ri..""lg the 1940s trends started during the earlier decade, 
Latin Awrican policy-makers looked back with satisfaction to 
the performance and structu:--al changes registered between the late 
1920s and the early 1950s. The economies of the reg-,ion had on the whole 
showed remnrkable resilience m the face of unusually frequent and 
severe shocks en::uiatil'lg from the international econorey. First cc1r.e the 
collapse of the old international economi.c order in the early 1930s, 
fundamentally a negative external demand shock (D{az Alejandro 1980 and 
1981). 'lhe 1940s witnessed not just further negative as well as 
positive demand nhocks, but also severe supply disruptions. Had 
these shocks been foreseen in the late 1920s few would have foreca$tcd 
that by the early 1950s Latin /inerican economies not only had adjusted 
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to them, but in the process had built up a substantial dorrestic industry 
while drastically reducine its reliance on foreign capital and trade. 
Many years later one could see in the 1945-52 euphoria the seeds (for 
sorre countries) of troubles to cone, yet any observer looking around 
the world during those years could find few areas where the future 
looked roore pram.sing, both economically and politically, than in 
Latin America. 
While the 1930s shocks elicited quite heterogeneous responses 
from different types of Latin American countries, the 1940s prosperity 
was widespread, although the intensity naturally varied from country 
to country. A typology based not on intensity of prosperity but on 
policies seems more interesting for the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Countries with medium or large domestic markets, and which on 
the whole reacted to the 1930s shocks vigorously, by the early 1950s had 
diverged in their policies. Solre, such as Mexico and Peru, realigned 
their exchange rates and inport-repressing policies so as to increase 
incentives to foreign trade. Others, such as those in the Southern Cone 
and Brazil, strengthened import-repressing mechanisms, giving low 
priority to foreign trade. Central American, Caribbean and other smaller 
countries (including those still under colonial rule), followed passive 
and open policies, which during the 1930s had proven catastrophic for 
.. many of them but that in the circumstances of the 19110s and early 1950s 
carried them al~ the prosperous tide emanatin-; from North America. 
'lhe rest of the paper is organized as follows. '!he sequence and 
nature of disturbances generated by the international economy will first 
be examined, 'llus will be followed by an analysis of the policies 
adopted by Latin American countries to cope with those shocks and with 
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other pressures emanat:1ng danestically. Then the result:1.ru:'; econam.:l.c 
perforniance will be discussed. '1he paper will close with some remar.ks 
about the state of the La.tin American economies during the early 1950s. 
II. EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND TR....~ 
September 1939 meant both a loss of export markets and a decline 
in sources of supply to La.tin America. At first the negative demand 
shock predominated, and some policy-makers feared a repla__v of the early 
1930s. By D:!cember 1941 it had become clear that supply short~es 
were to be the major problem. Ir.Jports into the region reached a troth 
during 1942-:--43, not because of a lack of demand or foreign exchange 
but either because there were no goods to be found.or because there were 
no ships to transport them. Supply conditions in r.x:>st countries im­
proved thereafter, by how much depending on geographical and political 
proximity to the United States, but remained a major constraint and 
preoccupation, so that the outbreak of hostilities in Korea during 
June 1950 triggered a massive import binge. 
Pationing ai:"1d price controls canplicate the interpretation of 
the usual foreign trade indicators. Nevertheless, as a broad general­
ization it can be said that the Latin American ternlS of trade, defined 
as the ratio of export to import prices, w1tnessed an upward trend 
during the 1940s, which cootinued their recovery from the troth reached 
during 1930-34, and which culminated during 1950-54. '!here are of 
course deviations fran this average trend; exporters of tenperate food­
stuffs saw their ternlS of trade peak during 1945-49, while coffee 
exporters witnessed an unusual bonanza during 1950-54. Did the postwar 
peaks in tems of trade surpass those of the late 1920s? Such long 
tenn comparisons of price indices are notoriously treacherous, 
particularly given the sharp change which occurred in the Latin American 
import bill between those two periods. Recorded price data show that 
at least for the largest countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colanbia and 
~xico) the postwar peaks 1n tenns of trade surpassed or practically 
reached the 1928-29 levels. 
While the tern1S of trade improved with only minor hiccups, 
such as the one in 1949, the aggregate export quantum for the region 
as a whole was slw;;ish. Shipping shortages account for a decline between 
1935-39 and 1940-li4, but the recovery in the regional export quantum 
thereafter was slow, so that b:, 1950-54 it was hardly above the 1935-39 
levels. In per capita tern1S of course it had declined, a decline which 
reached spectacular dimensions for Argentina, but which was not registered 
by all republics. Indeed, while the collapse of exports during the 1930s 
was witnessed throughout Latin America, by the late 1940s and early 1950s 
export performance becam:! more heterogeneous. That heterogeneity was 
due not only to the "corrmodity lottery" but also to the variety of donestic 
policies regarding foreign trade, as will be discussed below. In sane 
cases per capita exports by the early 1950s were above even the levels 
reached during the late 1920s, while in other countries it was substan­
tially below. 
The inport quantum is a roore interesting statistic during the 
'1940s than the purchasing power of exports. D.Jring 1940-44 the fonner 
1s substantially below the latter, a situation reversed after the war. 
For the region as a whole, imports c9llapsed during 1940-44 to levels 
not far above those of the depressed conditions ten years earlier. 
I>om?stic producers of iltport-canpeting goods and services saw their 
. . 
foreign corrpetition practically disappear, but their capacity to supply 
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machinery and equipment, fuels arld many raw materials and interrnedjate 
goods was limited. Even nore so than during the 1930s the fall in 
per capita imports did not mean a correspondinr, increase in the per 
capita dcmcstic production of importable goods; it was also accol'J1)anied 
by lower consunption of previously imported r,oods and lower investrient 
1n machinery and equipment. After the war the regional in:port qunntum 
recovered sharply, so that by 1950-54 it was roore than twice the 1940-414 
level and about 80 percent above the 1935-39 level. 'lhe regional 
aggregate hides greater variance during the postwar than during the 
1930s, so that by 1950-54 one has Argentina with imports below 1935-39 
levels, while El Salvador and Venezuela have inport levels sharply 
above 1935-39. Mexico is one of the very few countries whose import 
!Juantum did not fall during the war. 
The postwar recovery of foreign trade left per capita imports 
of major Latin American countries below levels reached during the 1920s. 
Table 1 shows that in this sense recovery from the Great Depression 
was incanplete in key countries, such as Argentina and Chile, whose 
particular experience was to exert a disproportionate influence on 
postwar Latin American economic thinking. It may be noted that 1928 
and 1929 were for sol!E countries unusually prosperous years relative 
to the rest of the 1920s, while for others they already registered 
foreign trade indicators below those obtained earlier that decade, 
as 1n the CUban case. It appears that countries whose foreim trade 
had lagr,ed behind those of the rest of Latin America up to the 1920s 
were to experience the fastest postwar 1nport expansion, as 1n the 
cases of Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela. 
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Table 1 
Per capita Import Quantum 
(1935-39 = 100) 
1928-29 1950-51t 
Argentina 169 61' 
Brazil 172 159 
Colombia 15!J 121' 
Chile 221 101 
Cuba 195 175 
Ecuador 1Li9 193 
El Salvador 195 254 
Mexico 157 154 
Venezuela 240 312 
Sources: CUban imports at current prices were obtained fran 
_Direci6n General de Estaafstica, 1959. They were deflated by 
the United States Wholesale Price Index, obtained from Census, 
1960. All other data obtained from Naciones Unidas, 1976• 
... 
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Unexpected changes in autonomous capital movements, which ag;:,;ra­
vated the crisis of the early 1930s, provided few shocks durinr.; the 
1940s and early 1950s sbnply because of the shrivelling of inten1at1onal 
financial flows. Both loans fran external public agencies, such as 
the Export and Import Bank of the United States, as well as private 
foreign investrrent occurred at levels which were fairly predictable 
and relatively unimportant fran a balance of payments viewpoint. 'lhe 
most significant changes in the capital account of La.tin Arnerican 
balance of payments during the 1940s and early 1950s were the 
financial counterparts to the real disturbances described earlier: 
when foreign supplies shrank foreign excha"lge reserves rose, and 
when foreign supplies expanded reserves dwindled. It will be seen 
below that the management of reserve changes provided serious challenges 
for policy makers, both at the macroeconomic ·level and regarding their 
optimal use in time and purpose. 
By the late 1930s it was reasonably clear that laissez-faire 
was finished in international economic relations; by the late 1940s 
Latin AiTerican policy makers could base their actions on disconcertingly 
different yet plausible assumptions regard1rig the future evolution of 
the international economy. The gloorey could focus on international 
political tensions, the devastation and uncertain recovery of Japan and 
'Europe, dramatized by the collapse of the return to sterling con-
vertibility in 1947, and renewed fears of depression in the United States, 
where a sharp recession occurred in 1949. Optimists could point to 
the Marshall Plan, new economics and new international institutions as 
harbingers of an expansive international econcxny. 'lllis debate was not 
to be. settled in sare countries until the early 1960s. 
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III. POUCIBS 
D?cidinc; what was transient and what was pennanent was harder 
than usual in the 1940s. Policies which had rrore or less settled dmm 
by the late 1930s, after the confusion earlier that decade, had to be 
reconsidered. The instruments fore;ed then, however, became very handy and 
were further strengthened and applied, not always felicitously. In a 
decade characterized all over the world by the politization of economic 
relations, even more so than during the 1930s, Latin American govern­
nents continued to expand their economic role, both in macroeconomic 
policy and regarding long-tenn development. As during the 1930s, the 
balance of payments provided a corrpelling focus of attention, and this 
section will first review policies primarily aimed at dealing with dis­
equilibrium in the external accounts,turning later to other macroeconomic 
policies as well as to those direr.ted at longer term targets. 
A. Balance of Payments Policies: The CUrrent Account 
Exchange rates during the 1930s rroved, in Latin American countries 
able and willing to manipulate them, in a direction contributing to the 
restoration of both external and internal balance. Sharp nominal and real 
depreciations in those "reactive" countries provided potent stimuli to 
import substitution in agriculture, industry and services. As reserves 
began to accumulate after 1941, the possibility of nominal appreciations 
t 
began to be discussed in reactive countries; while steps in
. 
that direction 
were insignificant, a clear trend toward -real appreciation with respect, 
to the United States dollar appeared, mainly because danestic inflations 
outpaced that in the United States. Countries which even during the 1930s 
passively kept their peg to the United States dollar, or modified it only 
slightly, while also maintaining a high degree of trade and financial 
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. opemess, continued those policies durinr-; the 1940s, and their nrice 
levels appeared to have followed inflationary trends in dollar prices 
fairly closely. 
Before and after the war policymakers in reactive countries had 
to weigh a larr;e mnnber of conflictin~ signals and considerations in 
deciding what to do with nominal exchange rates. Even in cou.'1tries where 
domestic inflation was higher than in the United States, at least during 
the first half of the 1940s, gold and foreim exchange reserves rose and 
tenns of trade improved. With demand for exports and supply of imports 
subject to controls by Allied powers, elasticity analysis of possible 
exchange rate changes seemed pointless. Foreign rationing, price controls 
and shipping shortages encouraged counterparts in domestic administrative 
cc:ntrols; unde~ these conditions price-level effects of exchan~e rate 
changes were also open to question. Not slli:'Prisingly, durinp; the war 
there were few exchange rate adjustments. 
The postwar exchange rate decisions were more complex, even assuming 
that major industrialized countries would gradually allow a greater role to 
price-oriented market forces. The prolonged suspension of normal market 
nechanisms made estimation of reasonable exchange rates a complicated task: 
it involved guessing at least about future terms of trade and capital flows. 
Countries with substantial pre-war trade and financial links to Europe had 
also to eval~ate prospects for European exchange rates and the 1mpact of 
European devaluations with respect to the dollar. Faced with these 
circumstances, Brazil, Southern Cone and some other countries maintained 
overvalued currencies well into the 1950s, preferring to rely durmg; most 
years on exch8I1{;e and import controls to manage the balance of payments. 
Multiple exchange rates, including gray and black ones, proliferated, but 
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those used in roost transactions were 1n real terms substantially below 
those rev.stered durin~ 1935-39 (exchange rates are here defined as 
units of dCllrestic currency per one dollar). 
By 1950-54 Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, had becane archetypes 
of overvalued currencies buttressed by controls. Fears that devaluations 
would exacerbate inflation and worsen the terms of trade, elasticity­
pessimism (hardly limited to Latin America during those years) plus 
perceived danestic redistributive effects were the intellectual props 
of this system of trade and exchartGe controls. Its defenders argued that 
it channelled rents from the export sector, including extraordinary postwar 
terms of trade, toward capital formation in industry and social overhead 
capital via the supply of foreir.,i exchange at che_ap rates for the im­
portation of machinery, eqw.p.'!1ent, and intennediate goods cctnplementary 
to d~stic production. Goods and services co11peting with local output 
were kept out, maintaining the extreme protectionism given by World War II 
circumstances. After World War I, it was claimed, incipient industry 
was allowed to suffer from renewed foreign competition; inport and 
exchange controls were to avoid a repetition of those events. 
other countries willing and able during the 1930s to adjust excha,ige 
rates dis so a,__r-,;ain by the late 19Lios and early 1950s, partly induced by European 
devaluations, thus avoiding the overvaluation and extensive controls of 
, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Mexico and Peru are exarrples of lesser 
reliance oo administrative quantitative controls; these countries by the 
late l9llOs and early 1950s had increased their real exchange rates 
above their .1nmediate post-war lows. 
In countries with extensive import and exchanr;e controls, tariffs 
lost jjrportance durine; the l9ll0s both as sources of.~overnrrEnt revenues 
and as inst~nts of balance of payments and protectionist policies. 
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While not all La.tin An'Erican countries Joined the General Al:'7'eernent on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATI), in the more open economies the postwar trend 
was for a standstill or a decline in tariffs relative to the late 1930s. 
As a result of both the manipulation of import-repressing rnechanisr:is 
and danestic econor:iic structure, by the late 1940s the cG11position of 
irrports differed arrong La.tin Ar.1erican countries. In Central .American 
and Caribbean countries consumer goods made up about half of the import 
bill; in the Southern Cone that proportion was only 15 percent. Capital 
goods accounted for one-fifth of all 1rrI>orts into Central Arrerica and 
the Caribbean, and around 40--45 percent in the more .industrialized 
countries in the region (United Nations, 1964, p.20). Even in countries 
where the share of consumer goods in imports was relatively low, as in 
Brazil, fears were expressed that the postwar irrport surge had included 
too many superfluous and luxur:;· items, partly because the foreign availability 
of those goods had returned to normal faster than supplies of capital 
and intenrediate goods. Inconvertible European currencies often had few 
attractive alternative uses to the purchase of consumer goods. The first 
report of the United Nations Economic Comnission for La.tin .America noted 
with alarm that trade projections of the European Recovery Program foresaw 
large increases of exports of consumer goods to South America, apparently 
ignoring the industrialization which had occurred in those countries, 
, and their needs for capital and intennediate goods (United Nations, 1949,p. 258) • 
Ch the whole, policy instruments designed primarily to manage 
the current account of the balance of payirents were given a more explicitly 
protectionist tilt during the 1940s and early 1950s than during the 1930s, 
Particularly in South America and especially after the inrnediate postwar 
bonanza, the import repressing mechanism grew in cooplexity; while 
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during the 1930s all policy 1nstrurrents made all jroports more expensive, 
after the war sane imports were deliberately cheapened (e.e., ca~ital 
goods and imports using abundant inconvertible currencies) while others 
were made prohibitively expensive. This system caITied a large 
potential for aggravating price distortions which had already appeared 
during the war. 
B. Balance of Payment Policies: The Capital Account 
The management of gold and foreign excha11ge reserves, the latter 
partly inconvertible;was the central capital account concern during the 
1940s. Reserves rose sharply after 1941; as the range of foreign goods 
which could be purchased with them was limited until the decade was 
well advanced, and because their foreign exchanp;e corrponent, rnainly 
dollars and pound sterling, could be maintained only iJl financial instruments 
earning interest rates well below actual and expected inflations in 
those currencies, early in the war a number of proposals were advanced 
to "repatriate'' foreign debt, settling in many cases 1930s defaults, 
and to purchase assets owned by foreigners. 
By 191J8, about half of the accumulated Latin .American current 
account surpluses of the previous decade had been used to repatriate 
foreign debt and to purchase direct foreign investments (United Nations, 
1949, p.224). British railroads were boup-)lt in Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay; public utilities were also acquired in several countries; 
'Mexico settled with oil cOil'l)anies which had been nationalized in 1938, 
Canbined with wal'-t~ measures against investments o\\ned or controlled 
by Axis nationals, by the late 1940s these policies left Latin America 
with the lowest levels of foreign debt ree-,istered this century, and 
probably also with the lowest percentage of the capital stock owned by 
foreigners which was to be witnessed this century, particularly outside 
Cuba and Venezuela. 
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'Ihere have been few detailed studies which could help determine 
the ex-post economic profitability of these settlements and purchases, 
or their ex-ante econanic rationality. Che suspects that the evaluation 
would depend heavily not only on the specific details of each settlement 
but also on assurrptions regarding the opportunity cost of the foreign 
exchange reserves, particularly those of inconvertible currencies. It 
is now lmown, and surely it must have been suspected then, that the 
United Kingdom seriously considered repudiatiru2; the liabilities it had 
accumulated during the war (Bolton, 1972). 
By 1948 preoccupations regarding foreign exchange reserves had 
returned to 1930s-type concerns with shortage, particularly of dollars, 
and especially in countries with traditional c~nt account surpluses 
with Europe and deficits with North America. There was renewed interest 
in external sources of long-term capital, which after the catastrophes 
of the 1930s were limited practically to loans fran the Export-Import 
Bank of the United States, the newly-created International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and private direct foreign investment. 
'1he inflow from these sources, however, remained meager relative to 
aggregate capital formation. Latin American policy-makers were dismayed 
at the abruptness with which the United States governr.1ent switched its 
attention from Latin American development to the reconstruction of 
'Europe. A mnnber of .1mportant Latin .American investment projects had 
received financial and technical support from the United States during 
the war, and expectations had been created that such measures·would be 
continued and expanded after the war. A rebirth of that war-time economic 
alliance (which excluded Argentina) was to wait until the Alliance for 
Progress, creating in the meanwhile frustration and resentment among 
Latin ~rican policy makers. 
C. Macroeconomic and Other Policies 
By the late 1930s reactive La.tin American countrien had developed 
the will and the rreans to contain deflationary shocks c~ from abroad. 
Both in 1937-38 and in 1940 the new·policies were tested, and were 
found to be robust. But after 1940 the external shocks were to be 
quite different fran those of the 1930s: in most years they raised 
aggregate demand and contracted ag.gregate supply. &>ttlenecks in 
specific sectors were often more visible than general supply problems. 
Countries had to S¼~tch rapidly from fighting deflation to combatting 
inflation. 'Ihe strupy.,le against inflation was less successful than that 
against deflation, so during the 1940s most La.tin American countries 
registered price level increases no smaller than those witnessed in 
the United States. 
D.lring 1932-40 changes in the m:::>ney supply of re-active La.tin 
American countries had been dominated by doo:estic credit expansion; 
starting in 1942 large reserve acquisitions became the major source of 
increases in the money supply. Towards the end of the war domestic credit 
late 1940s, the contractionary effect on dcmestic liquidity were m:::>re 
than offset by domestic credit. With the exception of the Argentine 
Central Bank, few monetary authorities had adequate anti-inflationar? 
coo.trols and even those in Argentina were weakened after 1943 (Triffin,1945). 
Expansion in domestic credit went partly to support new development 
programs for private agriculture, housing and industry, and partly to 
cover public sector deficits. While the tax structure had been modestly 
diversified in many countries during the 1930s, the sharp fall in 
inports during the war reduced the base of custans duties, still a major 
source of public revenues. Even as output rose, tax revenues shrank. 
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Dafense programs were added to the develop:nental expenditures started 
in the 1930s. With no sit']lificant bond markets either abroad or at 
home, by the end of the war many governm:mts had turned to their 
nx:>netary authorities for deficit financing. 
'l'he postwar import binge sharply expanded the tax base in 
caribbean and Central J\mer~can countries, but the rrore industrialized 
republics importing mostly capital and intermediate goods had to 
continue their search for other public revenue sources. Sane found 
taxation of exports favored by unusually high prices an attractive 
device, implemented either directly or via public narketing boards. 
Income and indirect ta.xes introduced during the 1930s were expanded. 
Nevertheless, even during the late 1940s and early_l950s, rronetary 
authorities remained a major source of public sector financing. Sane 
observers perceived a.structural inelasticity in the revenue machinery 
of La.tin Alrerican governrrents, and an irresistible m:rnentum in their 
developITEnt programs, particularly outside Central .AITY:rica and the 
caribbean. 'lhese smaller countries, plus Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, 
IT'.a.11aged to keep their iriflations not much :t1i.;;i'-ier- than th;e;t of the United 
States by no later than the mid-1950s. 
'Ille war encouraged the public sector activism which had developed 
during the 1930s. Rationed foreign supplies of fuel, machinery and
m many cases foodstuffs had to be allocated in ways compatible with the 
wartime spirit of national unity. A minimum of concern had to be 
shown for security needs, whether the country was closely linked to 
the Allies, as were Brazil and Mexico, or neutral like Argentina. Regulatory 
authorities for agriculture, conmerce and industry were strengthened or 
created; foreign trade cootrols were of course refined; prices and waees 
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carne under closer public sector scrutiny. Public credit institutions 
and public enterprises producin~ oil, steel, tra~sport services, electricity 
and annaments were expanded or started. '!he Arrred Forces, which in 
sane countries had shown interest 1n industrialization at least since 
the 1920s, bee~ very active in investment prograTTIS both in heavy 
industry and social overhead capital. 
The postwar witnessed a relaxation of sane of these controls 
but the public sector remained actively involved in ambitious developmental 
and defense programs, much more than during the 1930s, and with a more 
explicit and self-confident comnitment to industrialization and other 
long-term goals. The Anned Forces in Argentina and Brazil were to 
retain and expand their role in heavy industry and social overhead capital 
to this day. Public credit institutions whose creation could be advocated 
as correcting informational imperfections 1n domestic capital markets, 
particularly at their long-term end, in some cases expanded with the 
support of Central Banks during the late 191+0s and early 1950s, providing 
credit at interest rates lower than domestic inflations. Controls over 
many key prices, such as those for necessities, public utilities, and 
transport, were retained in Brazil and the Southern Cone countries well 
into the 1950s. European conditions encouraged the vigorous postwar role 
of many La.tin .American public sectors at least in two ways: as noted 
earlier the dim outlook for European currency convertibility and recovery 
induced many naticnalizations of European-owned assets; and the examples of 
growing British and French public sectors led many observers to conclude 
that laissez-faire and private enterprise, so battered during the 1930s 
and the war, were obsolete and would have a very limited role to play 
in the postwar world. 
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J)Jring the 1930s trade unions had been encouraeed by several 
governrrents in the region, such as those in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico;
urbanization and industrialization also promoted this trend from belo.....,. 
Trade union influence and strength peaked in such countries during 
the war, when corporativist, centrist and leftist organizers en the 
whole worked together to expand those organizations. Not lonr; after 
the war, governments increasingly controlled or manipulated the trade 
union moverrent, or encouraged by the cold war, suppressed their leftist
se@nents, which were also fr~nted by divisions between stalinists 
and anti-stalinists. In spite of the expansion in the demand for labor
registered during and after the hot war, in most countries urban labor
markets were kept soft by cont1nuing inflows .f'ran the labor-abundant 
countryside. In addition, several La.tjn /lmerican countries again 
n.ceived substantial mnnbers of European inrnig:rants after 1945, even
when their governments relied on trade union support, as 1n Argentina. 
In spite of their weaknesses, by the early 1950s trade unions in most 
countries had significant influence at least in public and other large
urban enterprises, and 1n modern transport. Particularly 1n their 
bargaining with foreign-owned firms, they corrrnanded considerable govern­
mental and popular support. 
, r:v. PERFORMANCE 
Even in countries perfonn:ing reasonably well during the 1930s, 
structural change was m:>re impressive than overall growth; during that 
decade sone ecooomic activities stagnated or collapsed while others 
surged ahead. In contrast, during 1941-51 all La.tin American countries
and nearly all major economic activities (with the important exception 
of agriculture and livestock, especially .1n the Southern Cone) grew 
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at rates which exceeded population expansion and were hi~.,h relative 
both to previous experience and to perfonnance in the rest of the 
world. Output growth outpaced capacity expansion during the war., but 
during 1945-51 the opposite occurred, as a result of a remarkable 
investrrent boom. Between the end of the war and 1953 the La.tin American 
capital stock increased by one-third (United Nations, 19511, p. 3). 'Inc 
growth mmentum was rnainta.med until the early 1950s, in spite of 
distortions and misallocations whose negative impact became clearer 
later in the 1950s. 
A. Macroeconomic Performance 
South American countries experiencing a vigorous recovery fran 
the depression dur:1ng 1933-39., registered more modest expansions in their 
Gross Dcmestic Products (GDPs) during 1939-45. 'Ihis was the case in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Chile, where capacity limitations beca11e 
particularly acute during the war. While national accounts data are 
scarcer for Central American, Caribbean and other smaller countries, 
it appears that they followed the war-induced acceleration in GDP gro~th 
occurring in North Arrerica. Mexico rna.inta.med the growth morrentum 
achieved since the early 1930s., thanks to favorable access to 
external supplies (Naciones Unidas, 1978). 
'Ihe second half of the 19li0s witnessed an average annual growth 
'1n Latin Arierican per capita GDP of more than three percent; all groups 
of countries participated in this remarkable perfonnance (United Nations, 
196lf, p.6). '!be postwar boan came to an end during the first half of 
the 1950s 1n the Southern Cone and some caribbean countries, such as 
Cuba, but it continued in coffee exporting countries, as well as 1n 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. For the region as a whole, per 
capita GDP grew at the still substantial rate of two percent per annum 
1 
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during the first half of the 1950s. Adjustinr; GDP for tenns of trad~ 
chanr.;es im.kes the 19115-50 boor:1 even more 1mpressive, yieldinr; for those 
years an average yearly (",I"owth, for the region as a whole, of rore 
than four percent in per capita real incane. As the presence of 
foreirJ} capital in the region, particularly outside Cuba and Venezuela, 
had declined sharply by the late 1940s, those increases 1n real 
. . 
:tnccrne accrued overwhelmingiy t~ Latin Americans. For the region as 
a whole, net factor payments abroad had declined to around two percent 
of GDP by the late 1940s; interest and profit of foreign capital ac­
counted for about ten percent of Latin American foreign exchange 
earnings at that time. 
D..lring the war the capital stock in all major sectors was :In­
tensively used; shortages of machinery and equiprent often meant that 
even repairs had to be improvised and obsolete capital was kept operating. 
Investment suri;ed after 1945, absorbing a good share of the foreien 
exchange reserves accumulated during the war and of the improvements 
in the tenns of trade. 'lhe gross investment coefficient 1n GDP during 
1945-49 for the region as a whole reached 18 percent and remained only 
slightly below that figure during 1950-54 (United Nations, 1964,p.ll). 
Current domestic savings plus those carried out during the war financed 
practically all of the investment boan, which extended both to the 
ccnstruction needs of accelerated urbanization and the replacerrEnt and 
expansion of capacity in the fonn of machinery and equipment. Imports 
of capital gocx:is also contributed to the absorption of technolop.;ical 
change which had taken place during the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
The investment s~e occurred both 1n the public and private sectors, 
with the latter accotmting for approximately 70 percent of gross capital 
accumulation. While external supply conditions r,radually improved 
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after 1945, specific supply short8.{';es bedevilled investrrent projects 
well into the 1950s. 'Ihe priority given by the United States to 
European recovery and the Korean War delayed or distorted more than 
a few Latin American investment projects for lack of desired machinery 
and equipment. Because of her non-aligned stance in international 
relations., Arr;entina was especially vulnerable to such complications 
in capital formation. 
Replacement, modernization, and urbanization needs also influenced 
the structure of private consur:iption after the war. Automobiles, 
television sets, and refrigerators, as well as nylon stockings and 
soft drinks were eagerly sourr,ht in the rapidly expanding cities. Local 
industFJ could meet only part of those needs, and by the early 1950s 
severe foreifll exchanri:e shortages were to make imported automobiles 
an exotic luxury good in Brazil and the Southern Cone. Urban middle 
classes, frustrated by their lack of access to many imported durable 
consumer goods turned to luxury housing w};.ile wa.1tine for the local 
manufacture, typically by foreign corporations, of the desired conrnodities. 
8. For-eirn Trade a11d Sectoral Performance 
Much of the evolutj_on of Latin Arrerican foreign trade durfne the 
1940s and early 1950s can be explained simply as a consequence of exogenous 
shocks and trends emanating from the rest of the world. But not all. 
~specially by the early 1950s different exchange rate and trade policies 
were reflected in contrasting export perfonnances. Foreit11 exchange 
earnings continued to grow in many Central An~rican and Caribbean 
countries, as well as in Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela., while 
tending to stagnate in Brazil and the Southern Cone. Sorre country shares 
:1n total regional exports chanced dramatically relative to the 
late 1920s and 1930s, partly because of danestic policies and partly due 
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to luck in the co:-:modity lottery. Ar,,;cntina had represented more than 
one thin:! of the exnorts of all Latin AMcrican reo;.1blics. in 1Q28 , and one~ 
quarter 1n 1938; by 195~ it accounted for only 13 percent of that total. 
'Ihe co~sponding Venezuelan shares rose from 4 percent in 1928, 
to 15 percent in 1938 and to 22 percent by 1954. The Latin .American 
share in world exports in 1954 was about what it had been in 1928, 
and was higher than in 1938. 'Ihat share, ho'l-iever, peaked in 1948. 
(United Hations, 1954, pp. 124 and 137), 
Tne war accelerated a tendency toward export diversification 
already visible during the late 1930s• .Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
exported substantial amounts of manufactured products, even to South 
Africa. New items entered the export bills of many countries and 
there was a trend toward rrore dorrestic processing of traditional exports, 
partly to save shipping space. 'Ihere was also an increase in intra­
Latin American trade, and proposals for closer Latin .American economic 
integration blossomed at that time, particularly in the Southern Cone. 
After 1945, however., both the boom in primary product prices as well 
as dorrestic policies 1.nduced a retreat from those trends, so that by 
the early 1950s the Latin American export bill was again heavily con­
centrated in relatively few corrrnodities with little processing. Coffee, 
petroletE.1, susar and wool accounted for oore than half of the region's
exports. In 1937 those four comnodities represented about one third of the 
region's exports,and the top four items then(petrolcum,coffee,maize and Kheat) 
added to less than forty percent of all exports. (United Nations 1949., 
pp. 276-278., and United Nations., 1954, p.132). Both r.ianufactured exports 
and 1n~ra-Lat1n .Arrerican trade shrivelled after the war; the share of 
exports going to the United States was much higher in the late 1940s 
than a decade earlier, but tended to decline as Europe and Japan recovered. 
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In 1953 a report of the Economic Cor.rrl.ssion for Latin Am?rica 
remarked: 
"Althouf")l at one time the ajms of Lat:1n J\merican economic 
development were assumed to :include liberation fror.i the 
burden of ir.:ports, the facts show that this ob.jcctive is 
very far from be:1ng achieved11 (United Nations, 1953,p.xxi). 
While such peculiar liberation had not been nccQ'il)lished, 
inl)orts of goods and services for the region as a whole had bee:1 com­
pressed below 15 percent of GDP by the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
no doubt below correspond.mg figures for the late 1920s. 'Ihe openness 
of Central American and Caribbean countries was of course above the 
regional average, while Brazil and the Southern Cone by the early 1950s 
had foreim trade shares :1n GDP lower than most Western European countries. 
Susta1ning W.j';regate growth which exceeded that for foreign trade 
implied ver-J different gro~·.th perfo:rr.iances :1n various branches of 
economic activit:1. We now turn to exa'1lin:1np; such sectoral differences, 
which generally continued the structural cha"1ees of the 1930s. 
Industry, broadly defined to include rrd..'11ng, construction and 
electricity, was the star performer while rural activities barely 
kept up with population growth, when the ref:;ion and sectors are taken 
as a whole. Conpar'inr-; 1950-54 w-ith 1936-40 the following average 
annual percentage growth rates are obtained for the major canponents 
of the rer:µon's GDP (United Nations, 1964,p.26): 
Crops, livestock, hunting and fishing 2.4 
M:1ning and quarrying 6.0 
Manufacturing 5.9 
Building 6.5 
TI'ansport and corrmmication 6.o 
TI'ade and f:1nance lj. 9 
Governrrent 5.1 
Other services 3.7 
'lbtal GDP lj. ~ 
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n.tring the same period, the export quantlll'!1 grew at an a."lnual 
rate of only 0.5 percent (Naciones Unidas, 1976, p.25); thanks to 
the 1mproving tenns of trade the import quantum expanded at a hir,her 
rate, but still below that of GDP. Population r.;rowth accelerated 
throw;hout the period, averag.1n~ around 2. 4 percent per an.111r.1, and 
reach.mp; 2. 7 percent per annum by 1950-55. '!'he expa.'1sion of urban 
population was of course higher, and accelerated from 3.4 percent per 
annt.nn during 1940-li5 to 4.5 percent per annum durine; l'.)50-55 (United 
Nations, 1954,p.29). 
In the more industrialized countries of the rer,;ion, exceptinr:; 
Mexico, manufacturing growth during the war slowed do'i-'m froM the rates 
registered during 1933-39, and was also below postwar industrial 
expansion. 'lhe negative impact of shortages of corr;:,lementary imported 
goods turned out to be greater than the positive effect of the near 
disappearance of competitive in:ports. Much of the 1930s industrial 
expansion in .Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Chile was based on intensive 
use of existing capacity both in manufacturing and .in social overhead 
capital; the further squeezing of installed capacity during the war: 
in spite of frequent feats of technological improvisation, began to run 
into insunnountable problems. Without imported rna.cWnery it was 
difficult to start new manufacturing activities and absorb forei;,;n 
.technological breakthroUP')lS. Electricity, fuel and transport, besides 
inputs used more directly in the manufacturing process, spare oarts, 
machinery for repairs and capacity expansion., all became extremely 
scarce at "any" price. Electricity output expanded very fast between 
the late 1930s and early 1950s, but demands r,enerated by urbanization 
and industrializatioo grew even faster, so shortar.;es persisted in many 
countries·well into the 1950s. 
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As the supply constraints became easier in the irrr.lcdiate postwar, 
manufacturing output soared a11d diversified, in spite of rema:1.ninr.; 
shortar;es of nontradeable inputs and of sa'":'le imported c~le~ntary 
items. 'Ihe more industrialized countrie~ on the whole rna1nta:1.ned a 
protectionist stance toward ccrnpetitive imports, raru:;in[!; from the 
extreme, as in Argentina, to the moderate, as in Mexico. 'Ihe postwar 
manufacturing boom showed signs of falterin~ in 1949, and experienced 
a rrore serious setback in 1952-53. 
The less industrialized Latin American countries, which during 
the late 1930swere far from using their full capacity, saw their 
manufacturing output grow dur:1.ne the 1940s faster than in the previous 
decade; during the war many of them also benefitted from geov--aphical 
and political proxinity to the United States. Even by 1950-54, however, 
nianufacturing in these countries still represented around 10 percent of 
GDP, while in Argent:ina, Brazil and Chile it was above 20 percent 
(United Nations, 1954, pp. 27-28). For Lat:in America as a whole the 
share in GDP of mining, manufacturing, plus construction was below that 
of rural activities 1n 1936-40; by 1950-54 this was no longer the case. 
Within manufacturing, sectors which had spearheaded import­
substituting growth during the 1930s, such as cotton textiles, building 
materials and light metallurgical and chemical activities, continued their 
remarkable expansion into the 1940s; during the war, textile exports added 
modest ll?l)etus to industrial expansion in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
War shortages of inte~diate inputs, such as steel, and of machinery 
and equipment encouraged at least concern with expa"1ding "heavier" 
industrial activities; preoccupation in the .Anmd Forces with military 
supplies reinforced that trend, especially in South America. l)irinp; the 
ea.......l~; l~l;Js the United States, fearinr. a prolonr:ed war, enco~~'"':<:-,3 
industrial expansion in several closely allied. Latin .A.':lerica'1 countr1~s, 
notatl:, !3razil. Man? of the proJects started to eX}'")a"1d t~ie dcr.ia.in 
o:' the "Arse:-;al of ~mocracy", such as the Volta P.edo:1c:a steel r.Jll, 
e:1tered production a!'ter U-:c end of the v:ar, b:: v:hict t:..""le the Ur:i ter. 
in :..atin 
durir:w: the 1940s, r,oinr: as far as startine a"1 aton:!.c enel"f"Y pro(O"a":l. 
froduction of r~:on :~a'l"J"1, pip: iron, a'1d sulphuric 
industrial1zed countries, spread rapidly after 1?45. '.Jevertheless, 
for the recic:i as a w:-iole t:1 1950-54 the traditional branches of 
manufacturing (food processi.'1f:', tobacco, textiles, clothinr;, buHdinr­
rnaterials) still dorJnated rra.11afact·.ll'i.'1g'_ output, a'1d r.ariy of ther.i 
rer.ained horre a11d handicraft operations. ~orts of r.iach:...'1ery · and 
equipi:Ent r.iade up a very lar~e f'ractioo of r;ross investnent in these 
i:;oods, even in the most ind1 stria.lized Latin .timerican countries. 
Manufacturir..g e;rowth dur'i.'11; the late 19-40s a."'ld early l 950s 
bega11 to shov, a characteristic which would beccrne even more disturbfr1r,­
in Jater years: a specific branch of production would grow very fast 
during a couple of decades or so, using up-tCHiate technology, until 
hare output had displaced 1.rr;:>orts; afterwards that sector would grow 
ooly modestly, and its installed capacity would gradually age and fall 
behind tecmoloe-,ical and product 1.rr;:>rovem:?nts abroad. In that import­
substituting cycle, "dynamic" industries gradually turried into 
''vegetative" ooes not only regarding growth rates but also in their 
technological levels and product quality. In the roore industrialized 
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count:rlcs one t,cp,a'l to r.cc not ,1 ust the old dichotor.r.' of }12..nuicra:ts 
and mocern factories, tut :a t·.·11olc sncctrun of averar;e lator product1 v1 ties , 
or i•tec~olop;ical den::,ities'', with the latest ~rt-suristituti~ 
branches hav:'_nr,: the hir~-.est productivit.v, if measured at domestic 
prices including protection incentives. 
Tarif'f-jumpinr: direct forcir-n investnent had cor.tributed to 
jmport substitution 1n Drazil and th·i Southern Cone at least si:-ice the 
1920s and continued to play a modest role durinr~ the 1930s. Even during 
the war United States corporaticns invested in Latin .Arnerican rnanufacturiw,; . 
after 1945 such i..'1Vestments multiplied spurred b:r protectlon and the 
fast expansion of regional markets. The technoloi;v supplled by foreic;n 
corporations beca.':le crucial for the advance of import substitution 
into newer and rore complex branches in chemicals, metallu:rrzy and transport 
equipment. The gross inefficiencies induced by the comb.ination of 
excessive protection and direct foreign investment, especially outside 
, 
Brazil, were to culminate .1n several countries with the establishment of 
inchoate automobile industries. The corr:pelling economic logic and the 
nationalistic m,vstique of the industrialization efforts of the 1930s and 
early 1940s were gradually eroded by the increasing visibility of inef­
ficiencies and direct foreign investments durin~ the postwar. 
Construction boomed durin~ the 1940s and early 1950s even more than 
manufacturinc;; in several countries this continued 1930s trends. E>.-plosive 
urbanization and the mcreasing use of autornobiles and trucks generated 
an almost insatiable appetite for ceirent. Table 2 shows remarkable per 
capita grm•,th rates for apparent cement consumption in most countries, 
even when 1925-28 is taken as the base. 'Ihe table also shows a catchinr; -
up ~~th United States consumption levels which occurred in many countries 
for this indicator of development. Cement was a ma..1or ir.Jport substituting 
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Table 2 
Per Ca;11ta Apparent Cen:nt Consur:1!)tion: Relative
-~o tl1.£._ United !..;tates and Grm:th Rates 21()2:.-.-1953 
Per Capita ConsUJ~tion AveraJ".,e annual p;rm..th(U.S. equa1.s 100) rates, percenta,r-es 
1925-28 1950-53 1925-28/1']'50-53 1935-38~19SCJ-53 
Cuba 33 35 · 0.5 8.1
Uruguay 29 51 2.6 4.9
Argentina 22 41 2.8 2.4
Puerto Rico 19 83 6.3 9.6
Chile 19 39 3.3 3.2
Venezuela 17 66 6.0 11.4
Panama 15 27 2.8 3.1
Co!3ta Rica 11 17 1.9 1.8
Ix>minican Pepublic 9 19 3.'l 8.3
Ja.'Tlaica 8 18 3.6 5.1
Peru .7 18 4.0 6.6
Brazil 6 16 4.5 7,0
El Salvador 5 9 2.3. 6.2
Colanbia 5 22 6.2 8.1
Mexico 5 22 6.8 8.4
Ecuador 3 9 4.8 5.4
Guatemala 3 8 -,Jr ..)"'.> 1.0
1Ionduras 2 5 3.6 4.9
Haiti 2 3 1.7 6.8
Nicaragua 2 8 6.1 4.2
Bolivia 2 5 ". 2 4.9
Paraguay 1 2 2.1 1.2 
United States 100 100 0.3 4.6 
Sources: Data obtained from European Cement Association, 1967. Apparent
consumption refers to production plus inl)orts minus exports. 
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:industr:1, ~owl.ng at an ann:.ial rate of more than 11 nercent between 1925-23 
and 1935-38, and at an almo:;t 9 percent arinual rate bctNeen 1935-38 and 
1950-53, for the rep;ion as a whole. 'lhcsc growth rates could not have 
been based just on a more inten31ve use of installed capacity; substantial 
investments and imports of machinery must have taken place in the cement 
industry. While during the late 1920s Latin America produced only 36 percent 
of its cement conslXTq)tion, the correspondine; fiQ..lI'e for 1935-38 was 78 
percent, and for 19:i0--53 it was 85 percent. 
Petroleur.i extraction and refininp: were also encouraged by the spread 
-
of the automobile. Even before Mexican frictions with foreign oil companies 
culminated in the 1938 nationalizations, the Venezuelan oil boom had 
gathered momentum. During the 1930s the net returned value to Venezuela 
from the activities of foreiQ1 oil companies on its soil was quite small, 
. I Ibut this situation was chanr.;ed in the mid-194Os when the Accion D?~ocratic~ 
governro:;nt pioneered the fifty-fifty formula for splitting rents. In 
1938 Venezuela accounted for 59 percent of world petroleum exports; by 
1948 that share was dO\•,n to a still impressive 54 percent, declining 
during the 1950s as Middle f.,ast deposits were favored by oil companies 
(United Nations, 1964, p.139), Petroleum extraction was significant 
but less inportant in Argentina, Colombia, Peru and of course Mexico; in 
these and other I.atin American countries oil production and marketing 
was daninated by state enterprises. Luring the 1940s and early 1950s 
those national enterprises had difficulty in expand~ production due 
part}.y to a reluctance of foreim suppliers of equipment and credit 
(including the World Bank) to deal with them., unless international oil 
coopanies were part of the arrangements, 
Other extractive activitie_s., both traditional and new; .received 
inpetus f:rom the war. A number of mininr, projects were encourar:cd by 
the Unlted States government to satisfy wartine needs such as a nickel 
plant in Cuba and several ventures in Brazil. 'lhe outbreak of Korean 
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hostilities renewed interest in these r.rlning projects, but briefly. 
By 19~2-53 mining faced depressed international priceG. 
'Ihe sar.e broad trends and signals \'1hich induced ~ort substitutinr: 
industrialization after the late 1920s also encoura,~ed rural activities 
to turn from ex!)ortin~ toward producing for the domestic market during 
the 1930s and 1940s. The ag~cate output of exportable rural com­
modities, such as coffee, wool,and bananas, remained practically unchanr;cd 
between 1934-38 and 1950-53, while production of goods destined almost 
exclusively for domestic consu3/tion rose by more than fifty percent 
(United Nations, 1954, p .135). Sore crops under,-,ent exnansions com­
parable to those of dynamic rnanu.facturin.r; branches; rice output, for 
example, more than doubled betv.reen 1934--38 and 1950-53, War devastation 
1n the Far East, which favored many La.tin .American exports, contributed 
to such import substitution. 
The share consumed dorrestically of even rural exportable output 
rose, most dra'Tia.tically in Argentina. Countries which historically had 
exported primary products but imported food became conscious of their 
wlnerability on the export side during the 1930s and on their :import 
side during the early 1940s. A sober observer noted in 1948:. 
"Experience has shm.n that in the present uncerta.1n state ofinternational trade, specialization is a gcmble that a responsiblegoven11Tient must try to avoid. The least that nations with agri­cultural opportunities, such as abound in r.iost areas of La.tin A"nerica,should aim at is to be able to feed themselves from their oi\n produce,_so that they can sit out a depression without suffering actualstarvation" (Wallich, 1948, p.162). 
Faced ~r:1.th uncertain external prospects and often discouraged 
by dorrestic policies, producers of exportable primary products in many 
countries did little to modernize their production methods. P~rpean 
techniques and Cuban sugar yields, for exan+>le,duri'1e the early 1950s 
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Grentr;'r\';ere little chanr;ed from what they had been in the late 1930s. 
technological dynanis.111 ,-:as shm.n by sotre import substitutinr: rural 
activities; capitalist ~nrminr; producing for the domestic market spre
ad 
rapidly during the 1940s and early 1950s, even as traditional sub­
sistence farminr, remained the predorunant rural rrode of productlon 
Even Mexico, which underwent1n the poorest countries of the region. 
a serious land refom during the 1930s, by the early 1950s had a 
rural sector encanpassinr, productive units of vastly di~ferent pro­
Since the 1930s, Mexico, Central American and otherductivities. 
countries expa~ded areas under cultivation by investing in irriGation
 
and roads. 
The vast and heterogeneous service sector ~lso engaged in 
import substitution during the 1940s. Shipp:1.n,r; shortages during the
 
war induced the expansion of national merchant marines; insurance, 
banldng, and corrrnercialization of i.'Tlports and exports ca"ne under · 
greater national control in the more advanced countries. Forei~ 
exchange earnings fran services such as touris.-rn and workers' remit­
tances became significant items in the balance of payments of Mexico
 
and Caribbean countries. In those countries which maintained acmu.n­
istratively corrplex import-repress:ing mechanisms into the 1950s, som
e 
corrrnercial and government services received substantial quasi-rents;
 
·while precise information is unavailable, it seems reasonably clear
 
that not all of the terms of trade r.,ains siphoned off from the tradi
­
ticnal export sector durinr; the late 1940s and early 1950s found the
ir 
w;zy into investrrent in manufacturine; and productive social overhead 
capital. A sif,1ificant share appears to have filtered on the wa.v 
into services of sundry nature. 
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C. Incorre distrihuUon and welfare 
If national accounts data for the 19/tOs are spott:,, those for 
1ncane distribution are practically nil. Discussion of chanP-;es 1n 
1ncorre distribution becomes hi.G'J1ly speculative. A possible clue to 
those trends r.,ay cane from examining changes in the allocation of the 
labor force, and productivity in the different sectors of the econany. 
By the late 1930s alm:)st 60 percent of the econo~ically active 
Latin American population was 1n agriculture, livestock, forestry and 
fishing. By 1955 that share was about 50 percent. Between the late 
1930s and the early 1950s the average labor productivity gap between 
rural and non-rural activities widened but only slip')1tl:,r, with the 
latter reaching 3.7 ti.Ires the former by the end of the period (United 
Nations; 1964, pp. 29-31). A very roup,h surrrnary of Latin American 
development durine those years may be given by saying that ten percent 
of the labor force was reallocated from a rural low-productivity sector 
to a non-rural high-productivity sector, with modest increases occurrinR; 
in the average productivity of each sector, but without a narrowing of 
the productivity gap between them. 
It would be erroneous to associate that reallocation with a shift 
"from agriculture to industry." Much of th~ increase in non-rural 
e~loyrnent cane from construction and a large variety of services, fran 
-the highly productive to those disguising unemployment. 'lhe heteroeeneity 
within non-rural activities regarding averaee labor productivities must 
have been as high as that within the rural sector. For the rep,ion as 
a whole, manufacturing proper e~loyed little more than 14 percent of 
the active population by the early 1950s, only three tir.les those enga.r;ed 
1n construction. ~ acceleration of urbanization durinr; the 1940s 
had a rnonentum larr;ely autonomous from the f";I'Owth of manufacturing. 
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It may also be noted that the share of population livin~ 1n area: 
rer;arded as rural (localities with less than 2,000 inhabitants) was 
arotmd 8 percentap;e points higher than the share of the labor force 
engaged in rural productive activities throw,hout the 1940s and 
early 1950s (United !-Jations, 19611, p. 29) • 
'Ille errployrrent eains in manufactur~, construction and other 
relatively hir)l-productivity urban activities must have raised the 
economic welfare of those fortunate to be amonri: the hired, but the 
impact of these trends on measures of incorre distribution, such as 
Gini coefficients, is moot. 'Ihe postwar boom and populist policies 
in several countries led to increases in the'share of wages in the 
value added of some urban activities, but it is unclear how much 
of those gains survived post-1951 softer labor markets plus inflationary 
conditions. In the countryside the 1930s and 1940s witnessed important 
structural changes in land and labor allocation amon~ subsistence 
farming, capitalist farming for dorrestic markets and production of 
traditional exportables. In sane countries, notably Mexico in the 
1930s and Bolivia in the 1950s; public policy led to important chan~es 
in land tenure. A plausible case (but weaker than for the urban sector) 
could be made that improvements in average rural welfare levels occurred 
up until the early 1950s, but little can be said rep;arctln~ the evolution 
of standard m?asures of inequality, either within sectors or for the 
eccnaey as a whole. What was clear by the early 1950s was that hopes 
that industrialization would by itself induce p;reater equality and 
ellminate poverty had been rnis/:!;Uided. The postwar boom had left 
behind highly visible symbols of disparity between rich and poor, as 
with luxury urban housing near mushrooming shantytowns, and between a 
,.. 
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handful of dynamic cities, often bureaucratic rather than industrial 
centers, and the rest of La.tin America. 
Educational and health indicators sw~cst slow but steady 
welfare irrq:)rovements, while rema:ining far behind those of industrialized 
countries. 'Ihe proportion of illiterates in the population of 15 
years and older around 1950 had fallen to 14-15 percent in Ar?:entina 
and Uruguay, and to 20-22 percent in Chile, Costa·Rica and Cuba. 
It was still 89 percent in Haiti, 71 percent in Guatemala, and more 
than 50 percent in Bolivia, Brazil, tominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicar3.t,r;ua and Peru (United Nations, 1951J , p. 60) . Among the 
rural population, the percentage of illiterates was of course even 
higher, reaching 67 percent in Brazil and around 40 percent even in 
Cuba, Chile, and Panama. 
By the late 1940s death rates had fallen to less than 10 per 
thousand :1nhahita'1ts in .Argentina and Urugua.v, to iess than 15 in Cuba, 
and to less than 20 in Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico; Nicaragua, Pa'1ama, 
Paraguay and Venezuela (United Nations, 1951J., p.77). Bolivia., Guatemala 
and Haiti presented the worst death rates. Nevertheless, as in the 
rest of the world, nedical breakthroughs during the 1940s raised health 
standards in oost countries independently of ·econorrJ.c growth 
perfonnance. 
V. '.mE 19qos IEGACY 
By the early 1950s most Iatin Arrerican economies showed structural 
characteristics sharply different from those of the late 1920s. '!he 
share of fore1.p.n trade in GDP was cut; in many countries per capita 
foreign trade was also below pre-depression levels. The foreim debt 
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slate had been wiped almost clean; direct foreip;n inve~trrent had shifted 
toward manufacturing for the dornentic market and awa,v fror:, export.:1nr; 
activities and social overhead capital, especially outside Cuba, Central 
Arrerica and Venezuela. Public sectors had expanded their role .1n 
production, credit and regulation. Population r;rowth had accelerated 1n 
rost countries and internal migrations had becane far more important 
than those across borders, leadinr, to unprecedented expa~sion of major 
cities. Partly due to the decline of foreic;n trade, partly due to 
urbanization and new products, the structure of private consumption had 
also undergone :important changes. 
Reviewing the 1930s and 1940s most Latin Americans could feel 
lucky, at least relative to the rest of humanity. The Spanish and the 
Chinese Civil Wars, World War II, the depth of depression in the United 
States, Stalinist purges, the political dependence of Asia and Africa, 
and the pains of decolonization in India and elsewhere could be viewed 
by Brazilians and l'iexicans as remote events that "could not happen here 
any rore. 11 Old aspirations rep-.,arding industrialization and control over 
for-ei@"l investment seemed on the WB:;f to becCATie realities. Some progress 
had also been made in democrdtizin~ Latin American societies; trade 
unims had expanded and political life had becc:rne more open and 
pluralistic in several countries. In contrast with the ideological, 
relif;l.ous, and ethnic frenzies of Europe., India, and even N'orth America, 
rost Latin Americans viewed themselves then as tolerant, a view largely 
correct at least in relative terms, and demonstrated by the many refur;ees 
who found a haven in the region. With the exception of the Chaco War,. 
the ColOtlbian violence, and the outrages of Central Arrerican and 
CBribbean tyrannies, sare of which had been installed by the United 
States Marines, the 1930s and 1940s witnessed little poJ.itical blood­
letting in Latin America. 
3S 
Exceptins; Art,mt1na, political and econanic relations between 
Latm America and the United States 1.r.;)roved markedly during the presidencies 
of F'rari}•:lin IA?lano Roosevelt, reaching a height of 1nt1r.lacy dW"inr: the 
war. Latin ~rlcan cDr.l)laints rose after 191J5, when the Ur.1ted ;tate3 
twned from intimacy to aloofness, while Lat:1n America, wit:1 the 
devastation of Europe and Japa'1, had beccne rore dependent on United 
State::; sup,,lies and r-arkets tha'1 before the war. CoTTJr'laints were \•.'ide­
rane;in.r;: wartime exchanr:e accur:1ulations, derived from exports at 
ceilinr, prices inposed by the United States, nElted tmder the heat of 
dollar :inflation; developrent loans, pranised at Rretton Hoods, were 
hardly visible; wart~ prcr.J.ses regardi.'1r; lonr;-run caT.lOdity price 
stabilization were forv,otten; the Marshall Plan threatened a shortaP::e 
of investrrent goods as well as of credits; the International :,1onetary 
F'\md seemed unable to achieve the convertibility of .European cur:rencies;
and the United States moved away !'ran the International Trade Orp'.,anization, 
preferrinp; to concentrate en the narrower pr:1nciples of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, viewed less favorably by La.tin American 
cotmtries. Our previously quoted sober observer wrote in 1948 words 
still relevant many years later: 
"Recent vacillaticns seem to indicate that as a nation theUnited States has not yet succeeded 1n defining clearly andrealistically what its :1nteres1s 1n the Latin .American sphereare. If the United States knew•••what 1t primarily wantedrrorn I.atin America, whether it be help in the mamtenarweof democratic ideals, or markets and sources of raw materials,or military and political support, it would not so eas~lyfind itself blowing hot and cold 1n quick successicri".(Wallich, 1948, pp, 157-158). 
'!he outbreak of the Korean oost111ties briefly suggested a 
return to wartime intimacy, bUt by 1952 Latin lm!rican-Uuted States 
relatic:ns had returned to a state of wirequited obsessicri which was 
to last \l'ltil 1958-59, 
3G 
Ia.tin J\rnerican economic thinking came into its own durinp; the 
19lJOs. Young technocrats participated in debates at Bretton Woods and 
at the Havana con_ference on the International Trade Ory;anization, 
meeting not only the leading international economists of the day, but 
also each other, findinr.; ccmnon concerns and for~in~ all-Latin ~rican 
interests. The creation of the United Nations Economic Cor:mission 
for Latin America was the major impetus behind such Latinoamericanization 
of fresh economic approaches. Starting with its report for 1948, the par;es 
of "ECLA11 or ''CEPAL" :imaginatively discussed topics of intense interest 
not only within the region but also outside, ranging from trends in 
the terms of trade, to international comparisons of industrial structure, 
and to the links between GDP and export growth (see especially ·united 
Nations, 1949, p.16, for Chenery-without--regressions). Latin .Amcricar1s 
were also active in the staffs of Keynes' "lusty twins''; althou,..:;:h by 
the early 1950s the twins looked stunted and even defonned., Latin 
.Americans in the International Monetary Fund helped to shape ideas 
such as the absorption approach to devaluation and the early, flexible 
versions of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. 
Sare of the ideas generated in that post,·iar fennent proved more· 
fruitful than others. In retrospect, one rnny argue that the ti.Ires 
encouraged too much optimism in some matters, and excessive pessimism 
in others. The growth of manufactur:1.ng which had occurred since the 
-
early 1930s, in spite of external supply and other disruptions, e;enerated 
coofidence, particularly in Brazil and the Southern Cone, that further 
stages of industrialization could proceed with just a bit more effort 
1n danestic savings and somewhat mre careful planning. Blocks of 
industries, it was felt, could be checked off sequentially: once 
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import substitution had been completed in one, it could be left alone 
without claims on ~orted macWne:ry and new technolo~ies, usinr, the 
scarce foreiQ1 exchane:e to import the machinery and technologien needed
t'or the next stage of import substitution. Had postwar techr.olocy 
stood still in branches of manufacturing such as textiles, that approach 
may have ma.de sense; but it did not, and plants so new in the 1930s 
had becorre obsolete by the 1950s, incapable of exporting or indeed 
survival without a protection greater than when they had been infants. 
Many who talk0d about the need to view corrparative advanta,..1e dynar.J.cally
overlooked the dyna"Tlics of industrial technical chanp.;e. 
'lhe many solid achievements of import-substituting industrialization
led sorre to downgrade those of pre-1929 export-oriented grov.th. The 
'many ills of Iatin t..merican society were rigidly associated with pre-
1929 openness to international trade and finance. False hopes were 
therefore aroused that the relative closing of the 1930s and 19~0s would
alleviate poverty, reduce 'lmemployrnent, improve incorre distribution, 
promote democratization, eliminate dependence on foreigners, and make 
the state willing a11d able to :fJnprove social welfare. By the late 
1950s many had switched their faith from_irnport-substituting indus­
trialization to revolution as the way to achieve those goals. 
The postwar tenns of trade boom was viewed by influential observers
-as a transient blip in an irreversible declining trend going on 
, at least since 1910-14. Pessim1.sm regarding the outlook for inter­
national trade was rife from either Cambridge (Schumpeter, 1943, p.124) to
Santiago de Chile. Many thow)1t that whatever international trade 
survived, it would have to be managed by political treaties, bilateral 
and multilateral. Sane of that pessimism had dissipated by the late 
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194Os, only to be reactivated t,y the Korean War. Dy 1952 a few may 
have fores0en the forthcominr :1ntematio~nl trade exoansion; if so, 
they appear to.have kept reasoned forecasts to themselves. 
Export-pessimisr:1 was not carried as far as allowinr:,; a serious 
decline in the export quantum, except in the Argentine cac;e. Brazil, 
for example, simply ~ave low priority to diversifyinG exoorts, 
ma.intainL'1V, its coffee eA"J)Orting potential intact; it had enowJi land 
and labor available to promote import substitution without damai:sine 
its exportable surplus. Peruvians and Mexicans recovered from their 
pessimism more quickly than Brazilians, while Central America'1s 
appeared resigned to live durinr-; the 195Os with whatever the 1nter­
national econor:w decided to do. 'Thus, some cou.>1tries were 1n a better 
position than others to respond to the internatiooal trade expansion 
unfolding in the 195Os and stretchin5 1nto the 197Os. Tne costs 
of the lae in j~ing on the new export bandwagon al~o varied, 
depending in qualitatively obvious but perhaps non-linear ways on 
size of the dQ11estic market, and on the extent of accumulated policy 
bias against exporting. 
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